Abstract-Cyber attacks are a critical threat to government infrastructure, commercial enterprises and personal devices. When belligerents attack cyber systems, they need to spread laterally to reach high value targets and communicate with their command and control sites. Intuitively, a layered defense including intrusion detection systems will limit the adversary's exploitation of the target. We apply lessons learned from epidemiology stretching back almost a century to derive a mathematical model to guide investment and configuration decisions related to intrusion detection. To validate this closed form mathematical model, we performed discrete time simulations covering the relevant ranges of several parameters. The results from these simulations validate our closed form mathematical model, which indicates it is a credible decision support tool for cyber security managers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mitchell and Walkup proposed models and simulations for cyber systems under attack in [17] . We extend this prior work in two important ways: First, the earlier research assumed that once an adversary compromised a host, the host remained compromised and active forever; now, we increase the applicability of the simulation by instrumenting a centralized intrusion detection system (IDS). Also, we add new metrics quantifying the persistence of the attacker; t h and t s predict how long the attacker will persist on a particular host and on the system, respectively. We continue to measure p c and p r : p c is the probability that an arbitrary host is compromised, and p r is the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its command and control (C2) site.
Our threat model is an advanced persistent threat (APT), and we assume a centralized IDS. This centralized IDS can comprise many servers performing analytics on lots of enterprise data. It is possible, and even popular, to perform intrusion detection in a decentralized fashion using one of the many personal security products (PSPs) available Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for unlimited release: SAND2017-2753 C.
commercially or a proprietary analog. However, there is a critical weakness with this strategy: If an enterprise is facing an adversary that is skilled enough to gain a persistent presence on one of their hosts, this adversary is also skilled enough to disable or defang the victim's PSP. Scanning hosts with a trusted centralized security appliance gives an objective, external analysis of the target in question. This is analogous to the best practice in computer forensics of analysts virtualizing hosts under examination and introspecting them using a hypervisor. Our threat model also assumes that if the centralized IDS misses a compromised host on one scan, it can pick it up on a subsequent scan. We call the former case a false negative and the latter case a true positive. A subsequent true positive could happen for a number of reasons: First, sophisticated adversaries will change tactics mid-campaign, so they may reveal indicators of compromise (IOCs) to later scans that they did not reveal to earlier scans. Also, if the IDS is signature-based, it could receive a relevant database update between scans. Third, if the IDS is anomaly-based, its classification model could have been retrained between scans. Kaplantzis, et al. [3] and Totel, et al. [18] are examples of contemporary research on centralized IDSs. In practice, local and centralized intrusion detection can be combined.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section II surveys other work related to this topic. Next, Section III proposes a closed form mathematical model inspired by epidemiology and a discrete time simulation that validates the model. Third, Section IV presents numerical data and figures that quantify and visualize the interactions between several input parameters and their effects on four output metrics; this section also identifies which parameters are more and less impactful to a cyber system under attack. Finally, Section V contains our conclusions from the study and identifies future lines of research.
II. LITERATURE SEARCH
Almost a century ago, Kermack and McKendrick [5] first proposed a compartmentalized mathematical model of disease propagation. This model is a system of differential equations, and each equation models one of the following compartments: uninfected members of the population (x), hosts who are newly infected by the disease (v), hosts who have been suffering from 978-1-5386-0683-4/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE The 3rd IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in the Cloud (SPC 2017) 978-1-5386-0683-4/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE the disease for some time (y) and recovered or dead members of the population (z).
Kephart and White [4] applied Kermack and McKendrick's work to cyber systems. The authors began with the SIS compartmentalized model: The two Ss from the model name represent susceptible members of the population (x in [5] ). The I from the model name represents infected members of the population (v + y in [5] ). The authors validate the SIS model using simulations of random graphs, hierarchical models and a spatial model. When [4] was written, the primary vector for computer viruses was the "sneakernet": shared physical external media. Our work considers attacks that propagate via network and collects additional metrics of interest.
Mishra, et al. wrote a number of papers applying classic compartmentalized epidemic models to information security. In [9] , Mishra and Ansari considered the SIRS model; Mishra and Pandey investigated the same model using fuzzy logic in [11] . The R from the model name represents recovered members of the population (z in [5] ). In [12] , Mishra and Saini studied the SEIRS model which employs a fourth population category: exposed hosts (roughly equivalent to v in [5] ). In [10] , Mishra and Jha investigated the SEIQRS model which employs a fifth compartment: quarantined nodes. In each of these papers, the authors modeled the number of hosts in each category at a given point in time with a set of differential equations and solved this mathematical system. Our paper provides the empirical data that validates this use of compartmentalized epidemic models in cyber security.
Lelarge and Colot [7] combined epidemic and economic models to predict how independent agents on the Internet will make security investments. The authors allow hosts to assume one of two states: secured by some security investment or not. Their X i corresponds loosely with a per host analog of p c . X i is a function of the agent's choice of whether or not to invest in security, the spread rate of the malware (comparable to β, which we describe in Section III-A) and the state of other agents. Later, Lelarge extended [7] in [6] . Our paper provides the empirical data that validates the use of this stochastic model in cyber security.
Han, et al. [2] characterized the effectiveness of three brands (network, host and instrument based) of moving target defense (MTD) subjected to a cyber epidemic. The model is based on a directed graph. This graph's vertices are hosts, and its edges connect each host to attackable neighbors. The set of edges changes over time. The authors' metric of interest is i u (t), which is a per host analog of our p c . i u (t) is a function of the dynamic directed graph, the state of the other nodes and the MTD under consideration. Han, et al. visualize the data that their models produce for π ⋆ 1 and Φ: The former is the maximum portion of time a system must stay in a configuration, and the latter is a cost function quantifying the system configuration. Our paper studies four intuitive defender facing metrics (p c , p r , t h and t s ) using discrete time simulation.
III. MODEL AND SIMULATION

A. Epidemic Model
A statistic of interest in epidemiology is the basic reproduction number, R 0 , of a given disease and population. When R 0 < 1, the disease is considered endemic for the population. This means that it will be localized and present at low levels. On the other hand, if R 0 > 1, an epidemic is possible. This means that the disease will be widespread and present at high levels. [1] . Intuitively, if the disease spreads from host to host faster than it runs its course on a host, the population is at risk. One way to estimate R 0 is to divide the contact or infection rate, β, by the recovery rate, γ. Formally,
. We assume that a rational, state-sponsored attacker will spread through a victim's network judiciously in order to avoid attention. We call this propagation rate λ and experiment with values between 1/(6 h) and 1/(2 d).
For malware infection to spread from one host to another, the candidate victim host must be exploitable and visible to the prospective attacking host. We call these properties, the probability of exploitation and the probability of visibility, p e and φ, respectively. Despite the fact that all devices have vulnerabilities, a particular host may not be exploitable during a specific campaign because the attacker does not have the budget or talent to write an exploit for this particular platform. Similarly, even though two devices are on the same network, they may not be visible to one another because of the network configuration the defender instrumented. We propose estimation techniques for these two parameters in [15] . Because we are interested in the probability of the intersection of two independent events, we multiply their corresponding probabilities. Next, we govern the propagation rate with this expression. So formally,
We assume that a competent cyber defender will employ a centralized intrusion detection appliance that scans each host in the enterprise at some rate. This appliance scans the hosts in an orderly fashion, so on average, it will need to scan half of the n nodes in the network before reaching an arbitrary host. Each scan takes i time to complete, so the recovery rate is one-half times the network size times the scan time all to the negative one power. Formally,
Note this is a first-order approximation for γ because the IDS will fail to detect a compromised host with probability p fn . Based on these definitions,
We expect to see substantially different statistics for configurations where R 0 < 1 as compared with parameter settings where R 0 > 1.
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B. Simulation
We extended the discrete time simulation that we instrumented in [17] to provide the data set for this investigation. We reused the Host and Network classes from the previous work. Hosts that are infected, but undetected, periodically attempt to compromise an adjacent host. The Network is a singleton that serves as a container for the Host objects and an instance of the new IDS class. This new IDS class is also a singleton and its attributes include: probabilities of false negative and false positive and the scan time. The IDS periodically determines if each host is compromised with some possibility of misclassifying infected nodes as healthy. After each simulation, we calculate statistics based on each host's times of compromise and detection (if applicable).
IV. RESULTS
We examine four metrics in this article: p c , p r , t h and t s . We described the first two in [16] , [15] , [17] : p c is the probability that an arbitrary host is compromised, and p r is the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its C2 site. We propose t h as a new metric which measures how long an attacker can expect to persist on a specific host; this varies over the course of a cyber attack. We also propose t s which measures how long the attacker can expect to persist on the system as a whole; this is a steady state metric. Table I summarizes the parameters that govern our model and simulation. The defender chooses seven of the input parameters, and the attacker only chooses one. This work would be less useful to the defender if the attacker chose more of the parameters. We exercise the per-host scan time, i, over the interval spanning 30 s to 16 min. This makes these results applicable to a wide range of IDSs including those that scan between 90 and 2880 hosts per day. We exercise the probability of false negative, p fn , over the interval spanning 0.05 to 0.2. The false negative rate for most of the 88 works Mitchell and Chen surveyed in [13] and [14] fall in this range. We hold the probability of false positive, p fp , fixed at 0. This is a simplifying assumption: false positive rate is typically inversely proportional to false negative rate. We sidestep exploring this relationship in order to avoid confounding the present study. We hold the probability an exploit exists, p e , fixed at 0.5. This manages the number of independent variables we consider in the present study by taking the average value of the complete domain from 0 to 1. In a scenario where a naive (e.g., recreational) actor attacks an advanced defender, a p e near zero is appropriate. On the other hand, when an advanced (e.g., state-sponsored) actor attacks a naive defender, the analyst should choose a p e near one. We exercise the network size, n, over the interval spanning 4096 to 16384. The complete domain for this parameter stretches from 1 (e.g., a single-person business) to the billions (e.g., the Internet of Things). Our abbreviated range applies to a large number of enterprises in between these two extremes and allows the analyst to extrapolate the associated trends and sensitivities. We hold the number of external hosts, x, fixed at 16. This manages the number of independent variables we 
consider in the present study by selecting one setting from the middle of the domain. The complete domain for this parameter stretches from 0 (e.g., an air-gapped network) to n (i.e., a network where every host can connect to the Internet). We exercise the intrazone porosity, φ, over the interval spanning 0.25 to 1.0. This is most of entire domain, which extends from 0 to 1. We exercise the propagation rate, λ, over the interval spanning one every six hours to one every two days. This models an APT that ponders each of the next hops in their campaign over the course of hours or days. The simulation results provide p c , p r , t h and t s . Figures 1 through 12 show the impact over time of IDS scan time (i), one facet of classification accuracy: probability of false negative (p fn ), propagation rate (λ) and network size (n) on three of our dependent variables: p c , p r and t h . Figure 1 shows that a longer IDS scan time (i) corresponds with a higher peak probability of compromise (p c ). This is intuitive because a longer IDS scan time means that the central IDS will take longer to scan all hosts so the adversary will persist longer on each compromised host. Also, a longer IDS scan time corresponds with this peak occurring earlier in the time domain. Although the interval between the values for the independent variable i halves between each setting, we see a much more dramatic effect between i = 4 and i = 2 where R 0 approaches 1. For i = 2, R 0 = 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5 ÷ 1 d × 8192 × 2 min = 1.422. Figure 2 shows that probability of false negative (p fn ) only has a small effect on the peaks of p c . Despite doubling the interval between the p fn values, the horizontal and vertical components of the p c peaks are similar. However, a smaller p fn value corresponds with a sharper peak, and the attacker can expect to persist for less time on the system. Intuitively, the greater recall or sensitivity (defined as true positives over true positives plus false negatives) means that the IDS will need to scan a compromised host less times before detecting it. Figure 13 will reinforce this point. Figure 3 shows that propagation rate (λ) mainly affects the time of peak infection. A faster propagation rate corresponds with an earlier peak probability of compromise. This is intuitive because a more rapid spread will compromise hosts more quickly. λ has a smaller effect on peak height and sharpness. Figure 4 shows that network size (n) only has a small effect on the peaks of p c . Despite doubling the interval between the n values, the horizontal and vertical components of the p c peaks are similar. However, a smaller n value corresponds with a sharper peak, and the attacker can expect to persist for less time on the system. This is intuitive because a smaller network size means that the IDS will scan all hosts more frequently so Figure 6 shows that probability of false negative (p fn ) only has a small effect on the peaks of p r . Despite doubling the interval between the p fn values, the horizontal and vertical components of the p r peaks are similar. However, smaller p fn values correspond with a sharper peak. This is consistent with the impact of p fn on p c . Fig. 7 . Probability of reachback versus time and propagation rate. Figure 7 shows that propagation rate (λ) mainly affects the time of peak reachback capability. λ has a smaller effect on peak height and sharpness. A faster propagation rate corresponds with an earlier peak p r . This is consistent with the impact of λ on p c . Figure 8 shows that network size (n) only has a small effect on the peaks of p r . Despite doubling the interval between the values for n, the horizontal and vertical components of the p r peaks are similar. However, a smaller n value corresponds with a sharper peak. This is consistent with the impact of n on p c .
Tables II through V show the R 0 statistic for the configurations we use in Figures 9 through 12 . Figure 9 shows that a longer IDS scan time (i) corresponds with a higher peak host persistence time (t h ). This is intuitive because a longer IDS scan time means that the central IDS will take longer to scan all hosts so the adversary will persist longer on each compromised host. Also, a longer IDS scan time corresponds with this peak occurring later in the time domain. The 3rd IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in the Cloud (SPC 2017) Although the interval between the values for the independent variable i halves between each setting, we see a much more dramatic effect between i = 2 and i = 1 where R 0 approaches 1; the curve for i = 1 is barely visible. Table II shows the R 0 statistic for the configuration corresponding with each curve in Figure 9 . Figure 10 shows that a larger probability of false negative (p fn ) corresponds with a higher peak host persistence time (t h ). Intuitively, the lower recall or sensitivity means that the IDS will need to scan a compromised host more times before detecting it. Also, a larger p fn corresponds with this peak occurring later in the time domain. This is also expected because a higher persistence time takes longer to accumulate. Table III shows the R 0 statistic for the configuration corresponding with each curve in Figure 10 . Figure 11 shows that a faster propagation rate (λ) corresponds with a higher peak host persistence time (t h ). In contrast with Figure 10 , the peaks occur at about the same point on the domain. This is intuitive because an adversary that spreads more quickly will flourish earlier. Although the interval between the values for the independent variable λ halves between each setting, we see a much more dramatic effect between λ = 1/(1 d) and λ = 1/(2 d) where R 0 approaches 1; the curve for λ = 1/(2 d) is barely visible. Table IV shows the R 0 statistic for the configuration corresponding with each curve in Figure 11 . Figure 12 shows that a larger network size (n) corresponds with a higher peak host persistence time (t h ). This is intuitive because a larger n means that the IDS will scan all hosts less frequently so the adversary will persist for more time on each compromised host. Although the interval between the values for the independent variable n halves between each setting, we
The 3rd IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in the Cloud (SPC 2017) see a much more dramatic effect between n = 8192 and n = 4096 where R 0 approaches 1; the curve for n = 4096 is barely visible. Table V shows the R 0 statistic for the configuration corresponding with each curve in Figure 12 . Figures 13 through 16 show the impact of IDS scan time (i), one facet of classification accuracy: probability of false negative (p fn ), propagation rate (λ), network size (n) and intrazone porosity (φ) on our fourth dependent variable: system persistence time (t s ).
Intuitively, t s is directly related to IDS scan time, probability of false negative and network size. The longer the centralized IDS takes to scan an individual host, the longer it will take to make a complete pass through the entire network, and the longer infected hosts will remain compromised; Figures 13  through 16 all support this. Likewise, a higher probability of false negative means that it is more likely the IDS will miss a compromised host on the first pass and will need to scan it again to detect the infection; Figure 13 supports this. Third, the more hosts there are on the network, the longer the IDS will take to scan them all, and the longer compromised hosts will remain infected; Figure 15 supports this. On the other hand, Figures 14 and 16 show that propagation rate and intrazone porosity have little effect on t s for these parameter ranges. V. CONCLUSIONS System managers can put this research to use immediately by using it to inform their investment decisions. If their system has an R 0 > 1, there is a big payoff associated with driving R 0 below 1. Decision makers can do this by purchasing more hardware to decrease the scan time of their centralized IDS. There is comparatively little payoff for simply lowering R 0 without crossing the threshold of 1. Also, system managers can expect a smaller impact from increasing the accuracy of their existing centralized IDS. Propagation rate and network size are largely out of the control of the system manager, but the former mainly impacts the time of peak infection while the latter mainly impacts the system-level persistence of the adversary. In future work, we will study a number of open questions from this article. First, we will consider a non-zero probability of false positive p fp in the discrete time simulation. Also, we
The 3rd IEEE Workshop on Security and Privacy in the Cloud (SPC 2017) will add remediation to the discrete time simulation. Third, we will instrument a cyber zone defense like the one studied by McBride and Mitchell in [8] . Also, recall (sensitivity) must have some bearing on the recovery rate (γ) and consequently R 0 . Given the range of p fn we considered in this article, we were able to derive Equations 2 and 3 without this parameter. In future work, we will add p fn to the R 0 calculation in order to increase the generalizability of this model. Finally, we will base additional simulations on real attack scenarios to increase the external validity of the current results.
